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does not vary depending on the number of claimsmadeunder the policy period.On this basis,Mance
LJ proceeded to reject the approach contemplated by Waller LJ in BAI stating (at paragraph 31) that:
. . . No authority was cited to us, apart from BAI and its successor cases, in which any court has
suggested that a party to a contract may be relieved from a particular obligation under a composite
contract such as the present, by reason of a serious breach with serious consequences relating to an
ancillary obligation, absent some express or implied condition precedent or other provision to that
effect. Either some conditional link can, as a matter of construction, be found between performance
of the two obligations or it cannot.Where such a link cannot be found as a matter of contractual
construction, I see no basis for a newdoctrine of partial repudiatorybreach to, in effect, introduce one.
Not surprisingly,Waller LJ, who found himself in the minority, adhered to the views which he had
expressed in BAI indicating that he saw no difficulty conceptually in construing a notice provision as
being an innominate termwhich neverthelessprovided the insurerwith theright to reject the claim if
there had been a breach which had seriously prejudiced the insurer. He provided no authority or
principle justifying the partial repudiation approach, but instead made reference to various books
which regarded his analysis in the BAI case as introducing awelcome flexibility in remedy.
Conclusion
Even though themajority judgment is based on sound legal principles, it is possible that the House of
Lords might be the ultimate place to determine the existence of innominate terms in insurance
contracts which might allow partial repudiation of those contracts. It appears that, at the level of
first instance, preference has been given to the approach suggested by Friends Provident over the
approach advocated by Waller LJ in BAI (see Ronson International Ltd v Patrick [2005] EWHC1767;
[2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 453). The present case sends a clear message to the underwriters. They
need to adopt clear and unequivocal language if they wish to deny a claim for breach of an ancillary
obligation related to the claims process. If they do not, the additional protection afforded by Waller
LJ's analysis in BAImight no longer be available.
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PERFORMANCE BONDS
Tradigrain v StateTrading Corporation of India
[2005] EWHC 2206 (Comm) (19 October 2005)
Facts
T had sold a quantity of wheat to the respondentbuyers, S.The sale contractprovided for the quality
of the wheat to be final in accordance with independent inspection certificates issued at loading. It
also required T to put up a performance bond in the amount of 5 per cent of the contract value.
That performance bond was subsequently issued by a bank in India.The bond, as is consistent with
general practice, was backedby a counter-guarantee fromT's bank.
After the goods had been discharged in India, S claimed that the goods were not of contractual
quality. They claimed US$908,250 which was the full amount guaranteed under the bond. That
amount was paid by the Indian bank.NeitherT nor its bank had paid under the counter-guarantee.
The Indian bank brought proceedings in India against T, its bank and S to recover what it had paid
under the bond.
The contract of sale contained a GAFTA arbitration clause.The GAFTAboard of appeal held that S's
call on the bond had been wrongful because the quality claim, it alleged, was not valid. It was invalid
because the contract provided for quality to be final as certified at loading. Even if the discharge
quality was relevant, S's evidence had not shown that the quality on discharge was non-contractual.
Additionally, therewas, in any event, no justification for calling thewhole amountof thebond. If at all
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entitled to call on the bond, it was entitled to no more than US$100,669.55 which was the amount
admitted to byT.
The board found that the retention by S of the amount of the bond, save for the figure for despatch,
was wrongful, but that Twas not entitled to the return of the balance of $807,580.45 (being the
difference between US$908,250 and US$100,669.55) because neither it nor its bank had yet paid it.
T contended that the award was wrong in law and that the authorities established that in such
circumstances it was entitled to the return of the overpayment as a debt due to it. S contended that
T's entitlementwas only to an indemnity in respect of loss causedby thewrongful call and retention.
Therewas clearly only one principal issue in this case:
Where it has been determined that a buyer under a sale contract has called upon a performance bond
provided by the seller in an amount exceeding the buyer's true loss, is the seller entitled to immediate
repaymentof the amountoverpaid or does the seller's entitlement to repaymentdependuponwhether
the seller can show that he, rather than an intermediate bank, has suffered an actual loss as a result of
the buyer's call upon the performance bond?
Decision
Christopher Clarke J allowed the appeal.He ruled that therewas an implied term in the contract of
sale that Swould account toT for any amount that had been paid under the bond to the extent that
the amountpaidexceeded the true amountof S's loss.That amountwas due toTas a debt,whether or
not T had indemnified either the paying bank or the indemnifier of the paying bank (Cargill
International SA v Bangladesh Sugar & Food Industries Corp [1996] 4 All ER 563; Comdel Commodities v
SiporexTrade SA [1997] 1Lloyd's Rep 424).
The courtwent on to state that the overpaymentwas duewhen the fact that itwas an overpayment
had been established either by agreement or judgment.The board of appeal hadmade an error.The
overpaymentwas due toTas a debt, and Twouldbe obliged to restore thatmoney to the Indianbank
directly or indirectly.Therewas no need to determine the precise nature of the obligation owedbyT
following the overpayment.
Comment
The tribunal's finding that the call hadbeenwrongfulwas not in dispute (it should, however, be noted
that from the facts, that the question was primarily whether overpayment needed to be repaid
immediately or whether it should be repaid after true actual loss had been determined. S argued
that Twas merely entitled to an indemnity as regards the overpayment ^ thatmeant that only after
the actual loss had been determined should S be required to reimburseTwith the overpayment.
Against this, was T's submission that the overpayment was due back to it as a debt, not an
indemnity.This issue has a direct bearing on the legal nature of a performance (demand) bond.
Anyoverpaymenton theperformancebondmustbe accounted for as an implied termof the contract
between the buyer and seller. This has been the position since Cargill International SA v Bangladesh
Sugar & Food Industries Corp. There, it was held by Morrison J that if there has been a call on the
bond which turned out to exceed the true loss sustained, then the party who provided the bond
would be entitled to recover the overpayment.On that basis, it would also seem to follow that the
account partymay hold the amount recovered in trust for the paying bank (where, for example, the
bank has notbeen paidby him).That said, that shouldnot affect his right to bring the claim in his own
name. A prudent bank would normally have required its customer to provide it with appropriate
security for the giving of the bond, whichwould be called upon as soon as the bank was required to
pay. In principle, it seems to be the position that the account party should always be entitled to
receive the overpayment since his entitlement was founded on the contract between himself and
the beneficiary.The analysis here is that, while the autonomy of the performance bond is a matter
of an undertaking by the paying bank, the right to receive any overpayment is founded on the
contract of sale between the applicant and beneficiary.That right is thus one based on contract and
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not quasi contract, as far as Morison J was concerned. That analysis has since been recognised in
Comdel Commodities v SiporexTrade SA and TTI TeamTelecom International Ltd v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd
[2003] EWHC 762. Indeed, when Morison J's judgment was appealed against before the Court of
Appeal, the judge's pronouncement on the nature of the right to receive overpayment was not
challenged.
An extension of that proposition, as far as Christopher Clarke J was concerned, meant that in the
present case, it did notmatter whether or not the sellers had indemnified either the paying bank or
the indemnifier of thepayingbank.The duty to account for overpayment is based on a debt ^ as such,
by calling for too much under the bond, S had procured payment to itself from the paying bank
(acting, for this purpose, onT's behalf ) of an amount that was not due and must return to its
contractual counterparty from whom it should not have been procured in the first place. If that
were not the case, S would have been handed a windfall since, to the extent of the overpayment,
there has been either no breach or no loss entitling S to retain it.
Itwas arguedby S that the liberal terms of the demandbond shouldbe honoured ^ as such, although
the amount guaranteedwas larger than the actual loss (as admitted to byT, the seller), Swas entitled
to make a claim to the full amount. It would only need to repay any repayment onceT had proved its
loss, but S argued T had not sustained any loss becauseT had not repaid the paying bank.The court
rejected the argument holding that it was not consistent with the general principle in Cargill
International SA v Bangladesh Sugar & Food Industries Corp. As regards the bank's position,
Christopher Clarke J held that banks would normally have taken some form of security from the
applicant so their risk of a loss arising from the applicant's failure to reimburse them would be
minimised. In the scheme of things, the judge was inclined to place the risk of commercial loss on
the bank. As far asTwas concerned, it would appear that although he had a preferential position
(after all it was entirely possible for T to receive the overpayment and then abscond with those
proceeds without repaying the bank) that was a commercial reality that any guaranteeing bank
would be deemed to expect. It is submitted that there is, however, a practical difficulty in that if the
beneficiaryrepays the overpaymentbefore thepayingbankhas itself beenrepaidby the applicant, the
beneficiary could find itself exposed to a possible claim for restitution by the paying bank. Matters
might bemadeworse if that claim is brought by the foreign bank using foreign law.
Itmight also be noted that, although not in issue, the arbitral tribunal hadmade an obvious error by
holding that the claim under the bondwas in breach of contract ^ that is inconsistent with principle
that a callmadeunder thebond is not in itself a breach of contract, unlessmade inbad faith (Deutsche
Ruckversicherung vWalbrook Insurance Co [1995] 1WLR1017).
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ICC ARBITRATION ^ LONDON SEAT ^ SUMS PAYABLE ^ FOREIGN CURRENCY ^
PRE-AWARD INTEREST ^ NON-APPELLATE REVIEW ^ SERIOUS IRREGULARITY
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SPA
[2005] UKHL 43; [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 310 (HL)
Facts
Disputes arose out of a contract to build the Katse Dam in Lesotho entered into by the Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority and a consortium of international construction companies,
known collectively as the Highlands Water Venture. The contract was on the standard FIDIC
Conditions of Contract (4th edn), with additional terms and conditions.The contract was governed by
the law of Lesotho.
The claims, for reimbursement of increased costs and for upwards adjustment to prices and rates,
were rejected by the LHDA, and the procedure laid down in the contract for the resolution of such
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